The Grey Zone: The United States and the Illusory Zone Between Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement by Curtis, Willie
The Grey Zone: The United States and the Illusory Zone Between  
Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement 
by Willie Curtis 
Willie Curtis is Associate Professor of Political Science at the US Naval Academy in 
Annapolis, Maryland.  
 
INTRODUCTION  
The post-Containment period has not been characterized by the peace of a new world 
order as envisioned by many Americans; indeed, since the end of the Cold War the 
international landscape has been witness to a proliferation of conflicts that seem to defy 
traditional solutions that had offered some measure of stability during the Cold War 
decades. The new challenges in the 'new world' disorder suggested that the demise of the 
Cold War stability had produced a vacuum in strategic thinking, leading to a fundamental 
policy dilemma  for the new Clinton administration in the wake of the US involvement in 
Somalia. This vacuum can be described best as an inability on the part of the new 
administration to advance a consistent strategy for adapting peacekeeping  policies and 
methods to the changing nature of conflicts in the post-Containment international 
environment.  
By 1993, it was becoming increasingly apparent to the new administration that the 
traditional criteria of peacekeeping would no longer suffice for coping with the conflicts 
dominating the contemporary international order. Moreover, one might make the 
argument that traditional peacekeeping methods had become an anachronism in the post-
Cold War era.   Indeed, this article will advance the thesis that a zone of illusion or 
uncertainty exists in the form of a gap between traditional peacekeeping and war fighting, 
and will question whether the administration's policies are clarifying the American role in 
the increasingly complex post-Cold War peacekeeping environment.  
This article will examine:  first, the nature of conflict and its implications for 
peacekeeping in the post-Containment era; second, the evolving Clinton administration's 
policy on the use of force and the national security strategy which call for the sequential 
or simultaneous conduct of numerous peacekeeping operations; and third, the major 
criticisms of the administration's policy. Finally, it will answer the question of whether 
these policies are clarifying the United States' role in peacekeeping operations in the 
illusory zone between traditional peacekeeping and war fighting.  
THE NATURE OF CONFLICTS IN THE POST-CONTAINMENT ERA  
The collapse of the stabilizing effects of the superpower competition that existed during 
the Cold War decades has created a security environment in which the very nature of 
conflicts poses new and major complications for national decision makers quite unlike 
those posed by inter-state conflicts of the past. The new conflicts in the post-Containment 
period have compelled members of the international community to reassess their policies 
for ensuring some measure of order in an otherwise anarchic international system.  
Whereas the major security concern of the superpowers and their allies during the Cold 
War was the fear of conventional conflicts between nation-states escalating into a 
superpower confrontation at the strategic level, Lynn E. Davis has described the 
dominant conflicts in the contemporary international system as:  
. . . involv[ing] violence within states among ethnic and religious groups seeking 
autonomy and independence. For such conflicts, political solutions upon which to base a 
peaceful settlement are difficult even to define. The rival groups are often unwilling to 
stop fighting short of achieving their goals; thus, any outside intervention to bring peace 
carries high risks and low probability of success.1
In addition, Davis points to another feature of the new conflicts; "rarely are they 
contained within existing state boundaries."2  An even more interesting assessment of 
conflicts in the post- Containment era has been advanced by Lt. Col. Ralph Peters of the 
US Army.  Colonel Peters argues that "[o]ne consequence of the diffusion of power at the 
end of the twentieth century has been the resurgence of the 'warrior' . . . this morally 
savage, unruly warrior, not the trained, disciplined soldier, will be the type of enemy 
most frequently encountered by Euro-American militaries."3 Moreover, he argues that 
"[i]n less-fortunate regions, the other man rejects the codes of the West even as he 
bitterly envies Western property and privilege,"4 and furthermore, "[i]n many places the 
collapse of the orderly structures permits the re-emergence of brutal individuals and 
collective forms of behavior that civilized men recently believed could be eradicated like 
smallpox."5  
Robert D. Kaplan, depicting  the changing nature of conflicts in his article, "The Coming 
Anarchy," writes that "[a]nybody who has had experience with Chetniks in Serbia, 
'technicals' in Somalia, Tontons Macoutes in Haiti, or soldiers in Sierra Leone can tell 
you, in places where the Western Enlightenment has not penetrated and where there has 
always been mass poverty, people find liberation in violence."6 Kaplan concludes that, "a 
large number of people on this planet, to whom the comfort and stability of middle-class 
life is utterly unknown, find war and a barracks existence a step up rather than a step 
down."7  
Citing Martin Van Creveld, a noted military historian at Hebrew University in Jerusalem, 
Kaplan suggests that to understand the present conflicts and "to see the future, the first 
step is to look back to the past immediately prior to the birth of modernism -- the wars in 
medieval Europe which began during the Reformation and reached their culmination in 
the Thirty Years' War."8  Van Creveld described that past as follows: "in all these 
struggles political, social, economic, and religious motives were hopelessly entangled. 
Since this was an age when armies consisted of mercenaries . . . they robbed the 
countryside on their own behalf . . ..  Engulfed by war, civilians suffered terrible 
atrocities."9  
Thus, Kaplan sees the environment and actions of hostile elements in Liberia, Sierra 
Leone, Somalia, Sri Lanka, and the Balkan as conflicts between "re-primitivized man: 
warrior societies operating at a time of unprecedented resource scarcity and planetary 
overcrowding."10  This characterization of conflict in the post-Containment era suggests 
that United Nations peacekeepers will be conducting operations in an environment in 
which the hostile forces may no longer abide by the rules of warfare that have 
characterized conflict between modern armies in the current Westphalian international 
order.  Indeed, one might argue that in many parts of the world a pre-Westphalian grey 
zone (or zone of illusion) exists, in which the rules of warfare and the humane treatment 
of civilians may not prevail.  
This raises the question of whether the guiding principles which have governed the 
conduct of traditional peacekeeping operations since their inception are still appropriate 
to the situations the peacekeepers will confront.  What then are the implications for 
peacekeeping operations in the grey zone between traditional peacekeeping and 
warfighting?  
IMPLICATIONS FOR PEACEKEEPING IN THE POST-CONTAINMENT ERA  
First, the basic characteristics of peacekeeping operations have been transformed. 
Second, the criteria for intervention and force structuring will have to be altered, and 
third, decisions regarding intervention in the grey zone are likely to emphasize national 
interests as a critical criteria for participation in United Nations peacekeeping operations.  
In addressing the first implication, one must take a retrospective historical approach.  The 
traditional or classical concept of peacekeeping operations since its inception more than 
40 years ago was predicated on the criteria of an agreement to cease hostilities between 
the warring parties, intervention with lightly armed impartial forces (normally non-
superpower military forces) under the command of the United Nations, with a mandate 
that emphasized the use of force in self-defence.  
These basic criteria governed traditional peacekeeping operations (with the exception of 
United Nations Operations in the Congo) and were conducive to intervention in inter-
state conflicts during the period of superpower politics. During this period the tasks of 
traditional peacekeeping forces were:  
surveillance in the initial and final stages of conflicts, either to prevent escalation (the 
preventive role), to monitor a cease-fire or troop withdrawal or as an element of 
interposition to achieve a negotiated end to hostilities. PKFs have therefore acted as a 
police force in charge of maintaining order at a delicate moment in which the presence of 
an impartial outside force can guarantee the fulfillment of certain agreements.11
Clearly, the majority of post-Containment era conflicts do not exhibit the characteristics 
of inter-state conflicts and the intervention in Somalia represented a departure from the 
classical approach to peacekeeping as defined above.  Somalia was an example of 
peacekeeping in the grey or illusory zone and its failure should have cautioned policy 
makers that they had entered an uncertain environment  in which both the United States 
and the United Nations were ill-prepared to venture.  The failure of United Nations 
peacekeeping forces in Somalia has been attributed to ". . . the lack of clear criteria of 
reaching political agreement between the rival parties, ignorance of the historical context 
and the social reality of the area of operations, confusion between 'peacekeeping' and 
peace-enforcement, poor preparation, total unsuitability or lack of neutrality on the part 
of some of the people taking part in the operations."12  
Thus, one lesson policy makers should have learned from the failed intervention in 
Somalia is that "the very concept of peacekeeping has serious limitations,"13 for UN 
operations in the contemporary international environment. Moreover, using classical or 
traditional peacekeeping methods in the environment described by Davis, Peters and 
Kaplan is clearly unsuitable, given the complex nature of conflicts occurring in the grey 
zone between traditional peacekeeping and warfighting in the post-Cold War era. Indeed, 
after the Somalia intervention policy makers at the UN and in the Clinton administration 
were forced to reassess the role of peacekeeping as a means of collective response to the 
disorder in the international system.  Thus, the question of criteria for intervention and 
force structuring became a matter of debate in both New York and Washington.  
The second implication for peacekeeping as a result of the changing  nature of conflict is 
that, after the public outcry following "a small but politically significant number of 
American military casualties, led in October 1993 to a major debate as to whether US 
forces should remain in Somalia,"14 both the United Nations and US policy makers began 
a reassessment of the criteria for intervention in areas of instability. The dilemma facing 
the United Nations in Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda was one of adhering to traditional 
criteria for peacekeeping in a zone where peace is an illusion. In the grey zone, adhering 
to criteria of impartiality, consent of belligerents and the use of force in only self-defense 
actually may undermine the effectiveness of the peacekeepers in providing an 
environment in which diplomatic activities may take place.  Indeed, the Carnegie 
Commission Report on Preventing Deadly Conflict concluded that: "[r]igid adherence to 
the concept of impartiality can circumvent active intervention by the international 
community in deadly conflicts. In several cases, preserving the principle of impartiality 
has limited the UN's options and frustrated many of the military and political figures who 
tried to settle dispute."15  
The question of how a military planner structures a peacekeeping  force for intervention 
in the grey zone if classical or traditional peacekeeping doctrines are the guiding 
principles is an important one, for the dilemma is that while "[m]ilitary intervention must 
be fair and just in order to maintain legitimacy . . . genocide, ethnic cleansing, and rape as 
weapons of war all call for prompt and severe action."16  This problem is stated quite 
candidly in the United Nations publication, Year in Review 1996:  United Nations Peace 
Missions:  
United Nations peace-keeping operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Rwanda and Somalia 
from 1991 to 1995 revealed the agonizing problems that peace-keepers face when their 
instructions for keeping peace and imposing peace become blurred; and when they expect 
to assume tasks for which they are not mandated, organized or equipped.17
The report describes the changing perceptions of peacekeepers.  "The most rudimentary 
definition of United Nations peace-keepers is that they are personnel voluntarily supplied 
and equipped by member States, dispatched by the Security Council, and serving under 
the UN flag, to accomplish a range of tasks defined by the Council, based on the 
presumed desire of the parties to end a conflict."18  And yet by ". . . 1996, a 'generation 
gap' between traditional and post-cold war United Nations peacekeeping, had become 
obvious."19  Thus, the United Nations report conceded that "[t]he United Nations, its 
Member States and their military establishments have entered uncharted territory;"20 
territory which may be characterized as a grey zone or zone of illusion of uncertain 
peace, a highly unstable environment in which there is a high probability that actual 
warfighting can occur at any moment.  Indeed, this uncertainty suggests that these 
situations are so fluid that a rapid shift from some semblance of peace to actual 
warfighting can occur with little warning.  
We turn next to the third implication of the changing  nature of conflict for peacekeeping; 
national interests as a critical criteria for participating in peacekeeping operations in the 
post-Containment era. Herbert Howe's analysis of the lessons of Liberia illustrates the 
importance of national interests in the decision to intervene in internal conflicts. He 
writes that "Western nations, especially since the recent intervention in Somalia, hesitate 
to help police conflicts which do not threaten their vital interests."21  This reluctance to 
intervene is examined in David Lake and Donald Rothchild's excellent analysis of the 
spread of the new forms of global conflicts. They provide policy makers with an analysis 
of the complex nature of one of the defining features of peacekeeping in the grey zone  
and suggest that "[a]s new intrastate emergencies arise, it can be anticipated that 
diplomats, analysts, and increasingly publics will raise doubts about the prudence of such 
undertaking "22  
It has become increasingly clear that "[w]hile the international community might benefit 
significantly from ending the conflict, it is in no country's interests to pay unilaterally the 
substantial costs of resolving the dispute by acting  as the world's policemen."23  
Moreover, Lake and Rothchild suggest that these factors explain the lack of strong action 
by the United States in Bosnia and Somalia. "The United States was unwilling to bear 
any substantial cost in human lives to guarantee the peace in Somalia -- although some 
casualties are probably inevitable in all peacemaking operations."24  
The question for US policy makers and other members of the international community is 
whether the United Nations should continue to move away from its traditional 
peacekeeping role of the past and venture further into the grey zone, a region in which 
neither the United States nor the United Nations seem prepared to make a commitment. 
Increased commitment to operations in the grey zone would signal an acknowledgment 
that traditional peacekeeping methods have become an anachronism and that policy 
makers may have to accept the fact that "[i]t is [a] sad, but realistic, commentary that 
some wars may have to go through the experience of the killing  fields for there to be 
collective exhaustion and a willingness to give up and truly find peace."25  
THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION'S EVOLVING POLICY ON THE USE OF 
FORCE  
The imperfections of this world will not soon be eliminated, so decisionmakers must be 
careful to employ their foreign policy tools responsibly.  This is a moral imperative 
because while "there is Raison d' Etat . . ..  On occasions it spills blood."26
President Clinton came to office highly optimistic about the revived role of the United 
Nations in providing for international stability.  Indeed, within the five-year period from 
1988 to 1992 the UN Security Council (with US approval) had authorized more 
peacekeeping operations than it had throughout its previous history.  The administration's 
enthusiasm for an enhanced role for the United Nations was evident in its early call for 
establishment of a standby rapid deployment force to prevent aggression.  
However, the administration soon experienced a reality check, for American participation 
in the grey zone of peacekeeping in Somalia forced a reassessment of US policy 
regarding peacekeeping in the post-Cold War era.  Some analysts suggested that the 
Clinton administration's policy was  based on a reaction to lessons learned from the 
Persian Gulf War and the Somalia operation. The lesson of the Gulf War was to seek 
quick victory, based on the assumption that the American people will not support military 
intervention that are not terminated quickly. The lesson from the Somalia intervention is 
the assumption that the US cannot afford significant casualties when minimal national 
interests are at stake. This is a rather simplistic analysis of  the factors affecting the 
Clinton administration's willingness to use US military forces in the grey zone; for that 
policy has been shaped by a set of principles  on the use of force that can be traced back 
to the decades of the 1980s.  
In a speech delivered on 28 November 1984, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger 
advanced a doctrine designed to establish six criteria regarding the use of military force. 
The "Weinberger Doctrine" would prevent the incremental employment of US forces, 
and when force was to be applied it would be used massively, with the ultimate goal of 
winning. The six criteria for the use of military force were later included in Weinberger's 
Annual Report to Congress for fiscal year 1987:  
   
1. The United States should not commit forces to combat overseas unless the 
particular engagement or occasion is deemed vital to our national interests or that 
of our allies.  
2. If we decide it is necessary to put combat troops into a given situation, we should 
do so wholeheartedly, and with the clear intention of winning. If we are unwilling 
to commit forces or resources necessary to achieve our objectives, we should not 
commit them at all.  
3. If we do decide to commit forces to combat overseas, we should have  clearly 
defined political and military objectives. And we should know precisely how our 
forces can accomplish those clearly defined objectives. And we should have and 
send, the forces needed to do just that.  
4. The relationship between our objectives and the forces we have committed - their 
size, composition and disposition - must be continually reassessed and adjusted if 
necessary.  
5. Before the United States commits combat forces abroad, there must be some 
reasonable assurance we will have the support of the American people and their 
elected representatives in Congress.  
6. The commitment of U.S. forces to combat should be a last resort.27  
The Weinberger Doctrine sought to provide a calculated use of American military force 
and advanced a more constrained concept regarding its use than that advocated by 
Secretary of State George P. Shultz. As Charles H. Marthinsen suggests, "[t]o some 
reporters and commentators, Secretary of State George P. Schultz sounded like a 
'Secretary of War' and former Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger came across 
as a 'Secretary of Peace' in their public discussions about the circumstances in which the 
United States should use force in advancing or defending its overseas interests."28  
"Americans," Schultz said, "must never be timid . . ..  We will use our power and our 
diplomacy in the service of peace and our ideals.29  
For George Shultz, "[t]he great challenge facing the United States, and the major 
significance of his speech, was the use of American power within the limits to further the 
cause of freedom. Observing that public support cannot be guaranteed in advance, 
Schultz said the US intervention in Grenada showed that 'a president who had the 
courage to lead will win public support if he acts wisely and effectively'."30  Thus, 
Secretary Schultz saw the Weinberger criteria for the use of force as constraining  the 
administration's ability to employ its diplomatic assets effectively.  
It is also clear that the Clinton policy on the use of force has been profoundly influenced 
by General Colin Powell, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and with 
modifications reflecting the US experiences in Somalia, the Powell criteria has essentially 
supplanted the Weinberger Doctrine. "Early in the Clinton Administration, then-
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Colin Powell refined the military force argument 
for caution. Though not as restrictive as Weinberger, Powell argued that military force 
should be employed only when it can be used decisively to accomplish clear military and 
political objectives, and with broad public support."31 Thus, it would appear that the 
Powell criteria  would govern the US participation in post- Containment era 
peacekeeping operations.  What are the implications of this for US forces engaged in 
peacekeeping in the grey zone?  To answer this question an examination of the Clinton 
administration's policy on the use of force is necessary.  
CONFRONTING THE GREY ZONE AND THE ILLUSION OF PEACE: THE 
CLINTON ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY ON THE USE OF FORCE  
The public articulation of the Clinton policy on the use of force can be found in two 
documents, the February 1995 National Security Strategy Report to the President, and the 
February 1996 A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement.  The latter 
lists three categories of national interests for consideration in deciding when to use force.  
The document stated ". . . while it is unwise to specify in advance all the limitations we 
will place on our use of force, we must be clear as possible about when and how we will 
use it."32  
There are three basic categories of natural interests that can merit the use of our armed 
forces. The first involves American's vital interests, that is, interests that are of broad, 
overriding importance to survival, security and vitality of our national entity -- the 
defense of US territory, citizens, allies and our economic well-being. We will do 
whatever it takes to defend these interests, including -- when necessary -- the unilateral 
and decisive use of military force.  
The second category includes cases in which important, but not vital, U.S. interests are 
threatened. That is, the interests at stake do not affect our national survival, but they do 
affect importantly our national well-being and the character of the world in which we 
live. In such cases, military forces should only be used if they advance U.S. interests, 
they are likely to be able to accomplish their objectives, the costs and risks of their 
employment are commensurate with the interests at stake and other means have been 
tried and have failed to achieve our objectives. Such use of force should also be selective 
and limited, reflecting the relative saliency of the interests we have at stake.  
The third category involves primarily humanitarian interests. Here, our decisions focus 
on the resources we can bring to bear by using unique capabilities of our military rather 
than on combat power of military force. Generally, the military is not the best tool to 
address humanitarian concerns. But under certain conditions, the use of our armed forces 
may be appropriate; when a humanitarian catastrophe dwarfs the ability of civilian relief 
agencies to respond; when the need for relief is urgent and only the military has the 
ability to jump-start the longer-term response to the disaster; when the response requires 
resources unique to the military; and when the risk to American troops is minimal.33
Clinton administration spokespersons have stated that the US responses "in the Persian 
Gulf through Desert Storm and, more recently, Vigilant Warrior, when Iraq threatened 
aggression against Kuwait in October 1994" were examples of protecting America's vital 
interests,34 while the US response in "Haiti and Bosnia are the most recent examples of 
important interests,"35 and "[t]he relief operation in Rwanda . . . [where] U.S. military 
forces performed unique and essential roles, stabilized the situation and then got out, 
turning the operation over to the international relief community represents the third 
category of humanitarian interests."36  Clearly, the document suggests that the basic 
criteria established by the Weinberger/Powell Doctrine will continue to shape the Clinton 
administration's approach to the use of force. As Goldich and Daggett explain:  
Over time the Clinton Administration has redefined and honed its policy on the use of 
force.  In formal policy statements, the Administration has said that a decision to use 
force requires a determination to commit sufficient forces to achieve clearly defined 
objectives; a plan to achieve those objectives decisively; a commitment to reassess and 
adjust the size, composition, and use of forces as necessary; and a reasonable assurance 
of public and congressional support -- conditions that echo much of General Powell's 
arguments.37
And yet, the argument can be made that given the current proliferation of grey zone 
conflicts, the criteria advocated by General Powell have the potential to constrain unduly 
America's ability to confront these most prevalent forms of conflict.  If, indeed, the 
Weinberger/Powell Doctrine on the use of force has been internalized by the Clinton 
administration, then it is essential to analyze the administration's national security 
strategy, which suggests that the US military may be called upon to  engage in the 
sequential or simultaneous conduct of numerous peacekeeping operations.  
MAJOR CRITICISMS OF THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY ON 
POST- CONTAINMENT PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS  
. . . early in this period, the United States became increasingly unwilling to use its 
military potential on behalf of international policy goals other than the protection of vital 
or directly-threatened U.S. interests. As a consequence, the world's only remaining 
superpower could also have been described in many ways as a self-deterred power.38
The current national security strategy would suggest that the US military will in all 
probability continue to be called on to engage in the sequential or simultaneous conduct 
of numerous peacekeeping operations, while struggling to maintain a force structure that 
can cope with the two regional wars contemplated by the Bottom-Up Review (BUR).  
What, then are the criticisms of the administration's policy on peacekeeping in the post-
Containment era?  A number of analysts have argued that the demands made on the 
military during this period of downsizing and budget reductions have created a mismatch 
between means and demands.  Some analysts question whether the military is capable of 
or properly sized to fight two Major Regional Conflicts (MRCs) and engage in 
peacekeeping and other operations other than war (OOTW) or small scale contingencies 
(SSC).  Another concern is whether the military can engage in increased peace operations 
missions and maintain the training and equipment necessary to be ready to perform its 
core mission of warfighting?  
The US General Accounting Office (GAO) conducted an extensive study of the impact of 
peace operations on the military's capabilities to respond to the demands of the BUR in 
1995 and concluded that, "[p]eace operations have heavily stressed certain key military 
capabilities, of which there are few in the active component, particularly certain Army 
support forces such as quartermaster and transportation units . . . while having less impact 
on other capabilities such as armored combat divisions . . .."39  The GAO Report 
cautioned that "U.S. military forces would encounter numerous challenges if they needed 
to be redeployed on short notice from one or more sizable peace operations to a MRC . . 
.;"40 furthermore, "[o]btaining sufficient airlift would be one of the primary challenges 
encountered in redeploying forces from one or more peace operations to a MRC."41  The 
Department of Defense took considerable exception to the GAO's  conclusions and 
replied that "[w]hile U.S. forces are participating in multilateral peace operations more 
frequently than they did during the Cold War, they continue to maintain the capability to 
deploy, fight, and achieve decisive victory against any potential adversary -- even in the 
unlikely event of two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts (MRC)."42  
Yet, no consensus has developed on this issue and the debate still continues, for as New 
York Times correspondent Eric Schmitt noted during the Rwanda crises, "the U.S. Army 
has sent five ships full of trucks, medical supplies and tents from Saipan, Thailand and 
Diego Garcia   supplies earmarked to supply American troops in Korea if war erupted 
there   to the crisis in central Africa."43  Many of the military's concerns were reflected in 
General Shalikashvili's remarks in September 1994:  "[m]y fear . . . is we're becoming 
mesmerized by operations other than war and we'll take our mind off what we're all about 
[which is] to fight and win our nation's wars."44  
Other critics suggest that the BUR did not reduce  forces enough.  David Isenberg, a 
senior research analyst with the Center for Defense Information argues that "the BUR 
established objectives for which its proposed forces are largely irrelevant   such as peace 
enforcement and peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance . . .."45  Isenberg is quite critical 
of the strategic assumptions underlying the BUR and states categorically that:  
More serious, are the BUR's faulty strategic assumptions. There are several significant 
fallacies: the belief that two major regional wars requiring a U.S. military response are 
likely to occur simultaneously and the premise that a regional adversary would have 
capabilities (especially the emphasis on armor and artillery), similar to those supposedly 
possessed by Iraq during the gulf crisis; the assumption that if the United States maintains 
large enough forces, it can overwhelm such an enemy and produce a quick decisive 
victory with minimal casualties, as it did in Desert Storm; and the assumptions that not 
only will most regional crisis affect U.S. interests and require Washington's military 
response, but that other major powers would remain inert during a full-blown crisis, 
forcing the United States to wage war alone against a dangerous aggressor.46
Clearly, there remains a debate about the extent that threats to international peace and 
stability should shape US force structure and whether defense budget cuts should 
continue.  The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) was to provide a new assessment of 
defense strategy and policy.  However, upon its release in May 1997 the QDR did not 
substantially change the two MRC requirement and suggested that "the demand for 
smaller-scale contingency operations is expected to remain high over the next 15 to 20 
years. . .."47  The QDR also stated that ". . . these operations will still likely pose the most 
frequent challenge for U.S. forces through 2015 and may require significant 
commitments of forces, both active and Reserve."48  
Despite the QDR conclusions, the core question remains:  will participation in numerous 
peacekeeping missions have an adverse  effect on  the military's ability to fight and win 
the nation's wars?  When considering US participation in  grey zone peacekeeping 
operations, the three key issues are: the impact of increased operational tempo; the impact 
on training; and the durability of peacekeeping as a mission. In each of these areas a 
number of analysts have been quite critical of the administration's policy. Nina M. 
Serafino, an analyst in the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division of the 
Congressional Research Service, provided the following assessment of the issue.  
The increased 'operational tempo' demanded by peacekeeping takes time from necessary 
maintenance, repairs, and combat training, and can shorten the useful life of equipment. 
Some analysts fear that readiness is jeopardized by dramatically increased operational 
tempos or lengthy continuation of the current pace because of peacekeeping duties.49
Some members of Congress and military analysts also were concerned that the effects of 
peacekeeping operations on training could contribute to a deterioration in readiness. In a 
March 1994 report on the Somalia operation, the GAO described military opinion as 
pointing to "mixed" training effects.  The report cited Army concerns that peacekeeping 
operations hurt combat readiness because soldiers are deprived of opportunities to 
practice combat skills and require reorientation to recoup traditional combat skills after 
returning from peacekeeping duty.50  Serafino explains that "[s]ome analysts question 
whether military forces in general and U.S. military forces in particular are, by character, 
doctrine, and training, suited to carry out peacekeeping operations,"51 while others 
question "whether peacekeeping is a desirable mission for U.S. forces?"52  
Regarding the first question, Serafino cites the reason as ". . . military forces cultivate the 
instincts and skills to be fighters, while the skills and instincts needed for peacekeeping 
are those inculcated by law enforcement training."53  Another reason is that peacekeeping 
requires a different approach to the use of force than combat operations. ". . . U.S. troops 
are taught to apply 'decisive' force to defeat an enemy.  Most peacekeeping tasks, 
however, require restraint, not an 'overwhelming' or 'decisive' use of force."54  
Another critic of the administration's peace operations  policy is John Hillen, a defense 
policy analyst at the Council on Foreign Relations and a former officer in the US  Army.  
Hillen recently wrote in the journal Orbis that the downsizing of the military has led to "a 
disparity between stated U.S. security commitments and the forces fielded by the nation . 
. . [and] the resulting strain (on both personnel and material) the armed forces suffer as 
they attempt to compensate with an accelerated operational tempo."55  Citing a 1996 
GAO Report, Military Readiness: A Clear Policy Is Needed to Guide Management of 
Frequently Deployed Units, Hillen points to the report's finding that "[t]his demand 
coupled with reduction in force size, means that many soldiers are deploying at a rate 
300-400 percent higher than during the Cold War."56  
Hillen also refers to two disturbing consequences of downsizing and increased 
operational tempos.  He explains that:  
with the decline in the number of its warships, the Navy has been forced to "gap" the 
assignment of aircraft carriers and other warships, meaning that other forces must forgo 
routine training, maintenance, and rest in order to cover the gap left by the absence of a 
carrier.57
As evidence, Hillen described the situation when ". . . the USS Enterprise left the Adriatic 
in September 1996 to reinforce the U.S. presence in the Persian Gulf during the 
confrontation with Saddam Hussein.  The sudden absence of the Enterprise forced the 
land-based aircraft supporting the implementation force in Bosnia to make up for the 
hundreds of weekly sorties flown by the carrier-based aircraft."58  Hillen stated 
categorically that "[t]hese requirements are literally wearing out men and material"59 and 
that ". . . the strain on the armed forces is lowering morale and the quality of military 
life."60  
While the debate continues and it remains unclear if US troops are losing their combat 
skills when engaged in peacekeeping operations, there is another impact that has not been 
assessed; one of growing complacency of troops engaged in peace operations. Hillen 
cites a letter he received from a troop commander, serving at the time in Bosnia. The 
commander stated his concerns as follows:  
"I have quickly realized why Mongols never conducted peacekeeping operations," the 
commander writes.  "It is an unnatural act. Aggressiveness, ingenuity and initiative are 
quickly punished while apathy, timidity and bureaucracy are well rewarded. My best men 
have become disenchanted about the service . . ..  The conditions are so good down here 
that complacency is rampant.  Every tent has four to six VCRs, central heat, a library, 
gym, full-service laundry, snow removal services, etc . . .. While it is luxury to have 
these, we have gotten very soft as a result."61
While no definitive answer is forthcoming to the question of whether combat capabilities 
are being degraded due to increased engagement in peace operations, it is also clear that 
the Clinton administrations policy on the use of force remains  a concern for many 
analysts.   Other critics of the administration's policy have focused on the potential 
constraining effects of the influence of the Weinberger/Powell criteria on the 
administration's policy on the use of force.  Professor James A. Nathan has been most 
critical of this.  He argues that:  
Since the mid-1980s, Clausewitz has been both embraced in discourse and abandoned in 
fact by U.S. policy makers. Ever since Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger 
announced his "doctrine," U.S. armed forces have labored under an expanding list of 
restrictions, foremost of which has been the conviction that force should meet a three part 
test.62
Nathan argues that "policy makers have been constrained to assure military planners that 
force is a last resort . . . used in an overwhelming fashion," to achieve "clear and 
measurable objectives."63  Nathan further argues that "[c]urrent policy theory reverses the 
Clausewitzian insistence on the supremacy of policy over any autonomous logic 
attendant to arms."64  He cites statements of senior civilians  working in the Pentagon to 
a  newspaper correspondent that "The Joint Chiefs exercise an incredible veto . . .. There 
is no interest on the civilian side of this building in challenging the Joint Staff . . .."65  
Professor Nathan concludes that ". . . military force is now precluded unless and until, as 
General Powell insisted, we can measure [how] the military objective has   been 
achieved,"66 and only then, with this clear "end state specified for the US military and the 
world to know, is a mission now 'acceptable' to the American military."67  This, Nathan 
argues ". . . stands the Clausewitzian relationship between policy and strategy on its 
head,"68 for as General Powell noted, "it's how political objectives must be carefully 
matched  to military objectives and the military means and what is achievable."69  For 
Nathan the potential effects of this new wisdom is that "[n]otions such as validating the 
power of the United Nations, ensuring that there is a price to pay for aggression, or 
punishing war crimes apparently would be abandoned if the Powell/Weinberger strictures 
prevail."70  
Is Professor Nathan correct in his assessment of the Clinton administration policy on the 
use of force?  Does the criteria advocated by General Powell unduly constrain US ability 
to confront the most prevalent forms of instabilities, conflicts in the grey zone between 
traditional peacekeeping and warfighting?  Moreover, does a  national security strategy 
which calls for the sequential or simultaneous conduct of numerous peacekeeping 
operations enhance US national interests or place at risk the military's ability to 
accomplish its core mission -- to fight and win the nation's wars?  The very fact that these 
questions were still being debated in 1997 suggests that the fundamental problem is one 
of whether the Clinton administration's policy on peacekeeping operations is clarifying 
the US position or confusing both Americans and others regarding peacekeeping in the 
grey zone.  
PEACEKEEPING IN THE ZONE OF ILLUSION: THE CLINTON 
ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY-CLARIFYING OR CONFUSING THE ISSUE  
If recent history is any gauge, peacekeeping operations in some as-yet-to be determined 
corners of the world promise to become part of the natural order of business for the 
armed services. The dilemma confronting uniform leaders is whether they can continue to 
adapt their forces and doctrine to that new reality without jeopardizing their ability to 
fight and win wars.71
In the latter part of the twentieth century, "President Bush's 'New World Order' policy 
represented an attempt to apply US leadership and power to the requirements; for order in 
a world that would succeed the politically frozen Cold War international system."72  
Upon taking office the Clinton administration faced a similar challenge, for the demise of 
the "New World Order" concept and the descent into the "New World Disorder" opened a 
debate on US participation in post-Containment conflicts that do not place at risk  any 
"vital" US interests.  Confronting an international environment of aggressions and 
sources of conflicts that to date have defied US policy makers' attempts to clearly identify 
has created a policy void that remains to be filled.  
Indeed, it is doubtful if a coherent overall national strategy can be developed that will 
have the sustained effects of the Cold War Containment policy that created some 
semblance of peace for approximately 45 years in Europe. The administration's task is to 
articulate a policy that will bridge the gap between the 1990s and the first decades of the 
twenty-first century, that will in all probability continue to be beset by a wide range of 
localized wars, aggressions, and violations of human rights and humanitarian concerns 
that do not directly threaten US national interests.  
A major challenge for the administration is to fashion and articulate a policy for US 
participation in the grey zone of contemporary peacekeeping operations. The 
administration has argued that Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25), its "Policy 
on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations," has provided a framework in which 
potential UN peacekeeping operations can be more carefully scrutinized and crafted than 
previous operations.73  However, it remains to be seen if PDD- 25 provides sufficient 
policy guidelines to cope with the complexity of peacekeeping operations in the grey 
zone and whether it clarifies or merely confuses ourselves and others.  
The Clinton administration's revised policy on multilateral peace operations was released 
in May 1994, and reflected both the continued influence of the Weinberger/Powell 
Doctrines and the experiences of Somalia and Bosnia prior to the implementation of the 
Dayton Accords. As Stanley R. Sloan suggests, "[t]he Administration had gone from 
U.N. Ambassador Madeleine Albright's advocacy of a US policy of 'assertive 
multilateralism' in June 1993 to PDD-25's policy of 'stringent conditionality'."74  
PDD-25 addressed six major policy areas involving US participation in peacekeeping 
operations. The six major areas are: first, making disciplined and coherent choices about 
which peace operations to support; second, reducing US cost for UN peace operations; 
third, defining clearly US policy regarding the command and control of American 
military forces in UN peace operations; fourth, reforming and improving the UN's 
capability to manage peace operations; fifth, improving the way the US Government 
manages and funds peace operations; and finally, creating better forms of cooperation 
between the Executive and Congress and the American public on peace operations.75  For 
purposes of this analysis, the first policy area, "making disciplined and coherent choices 
about which peace operations to support," will be examined. PDD-25 lists the factors that 
guide US decision makers in deciding to vote for peace operations in the UN Security 
Council, the factors to be considered  before involvement of the US or US military 
personnel, and the factors for consideration when it is likely that US military personnel 
will be involved in combat.  
Briefly, when deciding to vote for peace operations in the UN Security Council, the US 
officials will determine whether:  
• UN involvement advances US interests;  
• there is a threat to the peace;  
• there are clear objectives and means to accomplish the missions;  
• the consequences of inaction have been weighed and considered unacceptable;  
• operations duration is tied to clear objectives and realistic criteria for ending the 
operations.  
The criteria for US participation include:  
• risks to American personnel are considered acceptable;  
• personnel, funds and other resources are available;  
• US participation is necessary for an operation's success;  
• the role of US forces is tied to clear objectives and an endpoint for US 
participation can be identified;  
• domestic and congressional support exists or can be marshaled; and  
• command and control arrangements are acceptable.  
If US involvement will involve combat, the criteria are even more restrictive:  
• a determination to commit sufficient forces to achieve clearly defined objectives;  
• a plan to achieve those objectives decisively;  
• a commitment to reassess and adjust, as necessary the size, composition and 
disposition of US forces to achieve American objectives.  
Professional military planners might argue that these are common sense criteria, yet, on 
closer examination they constrain the US response to crises in the grey zone that in all 
probability will continue to dominate the new international security order. Moreover, 
"[t]he policy enunciated in PDD-25 makes threats to vital US interests the trigger for US 
action or support in resolving complex humanitarian emergencies."76 In the words of 
Stanley Sloan, ". . . taken collectively, however, against the backdrop of the experiences 
with use of force in the post-Cold War world, these factors appear so constraining as to 
be almost prohibitive of action. In effect, PDD-25 could be described as a very effective 
set of guidelines in a self-deterrence foreign policy regime."77  
No less effective than the Weinberger/Powell Doctrine, PDD-25 did influence the US 
response to Rwanda, the first test of the Clinton administration's new policy on 
peacekeeping operations. Indeed, when an estimated 500,000 people died and 1.5 million 
became refugees during the conflict, the administration applied the provisions of PDD-
25. The hesitancy on the part of the administration to become involved is explained by 
Nina Serafino in her analysis of 'PDD-25 in Action.' "On 22 July 1994, President Clinton 
announced U.S. military support for humanitarian assistance for the Rwandan refugee 
crisis in Zaire. The administration was careful to note that this did not constitute a 
peacekeeping effort and defended past decisions about level of U.S. involvement."78  
"Rwanda did not meet the criteria required for direct military involvement under PDD-25 
. . .. It simply came down to a strict national interest test . . ..  the new tougher 
requirements of PDD-25 simply could not justify intervention."79  As noted, "[w]hat 
PDD-25 has done is unmistakable. Support or participation will not be forthcoming from 
the United States if the peace operation does not advance vital U.S. interests."80 Clearly, a 
number of analysts see the administration's actions as seeking to apply the criteria of 
PDD-25 to justify nonintervention in grey zone peacekeeping operations. In the Rwandan 
situation the administration was responding to two constraints, "reluctance to require the 
U.S. forces to carry out all U.N. requested tasks and a desire by the U.S. military to limit 
their activities so as not to be drawn into ethnic conflict."81  
Strict application of the policy guidelines of PDD-25 will ensure that US forces will not 
participate in the majority of UN peacekeeping efforts and it is apparent if Rwanda is an 
example of administration policy that PDD-25 represents an effective means of justifying 
inaction in the major areas of instability today.  Indeed, the current impact of PDD-25 on 
administration policy has to date validated Professor Nathan's argument that ". . . the 
wisdom stands the Clausewitzian relationship between policy and strategy on its head, . . 
. political objectives [now] must be carefully matched to military objectives and military 
means and what is achievable . . . notions such as validating the power of the United 
Nations, ensuring that there is a price to pay for aggression, or punishing war crimes 
apparently would be abandoned if the Powell/Weinberger strictures prevail."82  
When assessing the current administration's policy on peacekeeping in the grey zone, one 
might add PDD-25 to these strictures, for as Commander Ware concludes regarding US 
actions/inactions regarding the Rwanda situation: "PDD-25 can be viewed as a general 
'use of force' checklist as it covers basic requirements to any military operation, whether 
it is a U.N. sponsored operation or unilateral action by the United States."83  Indeed, one 
is left with the impression that the rhetoric of the Clinton administration does not match 
its actions for "[i]n spite of the dicta in policy statements that humanitarian suffering and 
human rights abuse are interests which  the United States will defend, they simply [in the 
case of Rwanda ] were not vital to the United States."84  
Given its current performance, the Clinton administration's policy on peacekeeping in the 
grey zone or zone of illusion between traditional peacekeeping and peace-enforcement 
has created a considerable amount of ambiguity; and ambiguity can lead to confusion and 
miscalculation on the part of mischief makers during times of crisis.  
CONCLUSION: A MORE FORCEFUL APPROACH TO PEACEKEEPING IN 
THE  ZONE OF ILLUSION  
If the majority of conflicts and instabilities of the post-Containment era are likely to be 
intra-state conflicts by warlords, militia and other groups with total disregard for the basic 
principles of human rights and the laws of warfare in hostile urban environments and 
failed states, the US policy makers must provide sufficient policy guidance and doctrine 
that will ensure that the US military forces and other state leaders understand the role that 
the US will play in maintaining international stability.  While PDD-25 clearly attempts to 
balance the political and military demands it has not been fully tested in the grey zone of 
illusion in which neither peace nor war prevail.  
In coping with instabilities in the grey zone, the administration has sent confusing signals 
to the American people and other national leaders regarding US willingness to participate 
in grey zone peacekeeping operations. The administration's policy of relying more on 
international organizations and regional powers to share the burden of maintaining 
international peace and stability is laudable; however, unless the United States takes the 
lead few national leaders will be willing to place their citizens at risk in such situations.  
And  yet, the reluctance on the part of the US military to engage in grey zone 
peacekeeping is understandable, given the context of the current international security 
environment and the reductions in forces and budgets.  
Current national security strategy and PDD-25 do not provide a coherent policy for 
dealing with grey zone conflicts and instabilities in the international security order.  
Unless the administration is willing to forego US participation in these operations 
because they require difficult decisions that may not have full public or Congressional 
support, and to justify its inaction based on the criteria of PDD-25, the US will be 
rejecting its responsibilities as the remaining superpower with a stake in ensuring a stable 
international order.  
Today, President Clinton finds himself in a position similar to that of Austrian Chancellor 
Prince Mettenrich, British Foreign Secretary Castlereagh, King of Prussia, Frederick 
William III and Czar of Russia, Alexander I.  As Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. 
George write: "During the nineteenth century, the greatest challenge to statecraft was the 
task of devising a political system that would contain international violence and prevent 
war from threatening once more, as it had during the Napoleonic period . . .."85  This 
administration has the difficult task of assisting in shaping the international order that 
will take us into the twenty-first century. While the new conflicts and instabilities 
dominating the current international order may not directly threaten the vital interests of 
the United States, this author would argue that the US must take the lead in dealing with 
them or in effect 'write off' a large part of the world. Indeed, it will be necessary to take a 
more forceful approach to peacekeeping instead of clinging to the guidelines of 
traditional peacekeeping or Cold War criteria on the use of force.  The creation and 
maintenance of a relative stable and peaceful international order should remain the goal 
of US policy.  In this new international environment, where intra-state conflicts are 
fought by warlords, militia and even children warriors with little regard for the rights of 
civilians and the basic principles of the rule of law, and human rights, it might be prudent 
to consider practicing diplomacy as  advocated by that great American Will Rogers who 
stated that, "Diplomacy is the art of saying 'nice doggie' until you can find a rock."86  For 
peacekeeping in the grey zone of illusion, this may be the necessary prescription for the 
future.  
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